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Abstract
On October 14, 2015, Tesla Inc. an American electric car company, released the initial version
of the Autopilot system [51]. This system promised to provide semi-autonomous driving using the
existing hardware already installed on Tesla vehicles [33]. On March 23rd, 2018, a Tesla vehicle ran
into a divider at highway speed, killing the driver. This occurred under the control of the Autopilot
system with no driver intervention [53].
Critics argue that though Tesla gives drivers warnings in its owner’s manual, it is ultimately
unethical to release a system that is marketed as an Autopilot yet still makes grave mistakes that
any human driver would not make [46]. Others defend Tesla by stating that their advisories are
suitable and that drivers should ultimately be at fault for any mistakes of the Autopilot. This
paper will scrutinize the ethical implications of Tesla’s choice to develop, market, and ship a beta
product that requires extensive testing. It will further analyze the implications of Tesla’s aggressive
advertisement of the product under the name Autopilot along with associated marketing materials.
By applying the joint ACM/IEEE-CS Software Engineering Code of Ethics, this paper will show
that Tesla’s choices and actions during this event are inconsistent with the code and are unethical
since they are responsible for adequately testing and honestly marketing their product.a
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1 Facts
Tesla released its Autopilot system on October
9th, 2014. The lead marketing materials state
the following: “Full Self-Driving Hardware on
All Cars. All Tesla vehicles produced in our
factory, including Model 3, have the hardware
needed for full self-driving capability at a safety
level substantially greater than that of a human
driver” [48]. It is currently offered as an add-on
package that drivers can add either when pur-
chasing their vehicle or even at a later date [49].
Tesla’s cars have driven on average over 320 mil-
lion miles with one fatality which compares with
86 million miles nationally across all other ve-
hicles [53]. It is designed to be aware of other
cars and obstacles and stay within lines on free-
ways and other roadways. It is also designed to
activate emergency braking if obstacles are de-
tected. On March 23rd, 2018, Walter Huang’s
Tesla Model X crashed head first into a highway
gore point along Highway 101 and 85 in Moun-
tain View, California. The car at the time was
under the control of Autopilot; however, it did
not attempt to slow down and the driver of the
vehicle died as a result of injuries sustained in
the crash [53].
2 Question
Was Tesla’s response in the Walter Huang Tesla
crash case ethically justifiable, and was it ethical
for Tesla to release and market Autopilot as self-
driving technology despite only providing warn-
ings and disclaimers to consumers?
3 Social Implications
Self-driving cars and advanced driver technol-
ogy are quickly becoming important additions
to modern vehicles [12]. It is not outlandish
to imagine a near future when most if not all
of our daily drives are controlled by software.
Since corporations are responsible for the de-
velopment, testing, release, and iteration of this
software, there is a question as to whether they
are ultimately responsible for mistakes the sys-
tem makes. Analyzing the ethical obligations of
companies like Tesla could pave a road to finally
answering this question and setting precedents
for future legal regulation.
3.1 Public Safety
Self-driving vehicles promise to increase safety
and reduce fatalities at astounding levels. The
potential of comprehensive sensor suites and
computing in vehicles is promised to reduce ac-
cidents since over 90% of accidents stem from
driver errors [16]. By eliminating the driver, a
whole class of accidents, such as drunk driving,
texting while driving, not seeing traffic lights,
etc., can be eradicated. The social implication
of this would be a massive “900,000 lives saved
per year” [53].
3.2 AI and Responsibility
As artificial intelligence systems are introduced
as replacements for deterministic algorithms,
particularly in self-driving vehicles, a question
arises of who we hold accountable: the driver
or the designer [44]. There is also a deeper
question of whether it is morally right to hand
over decisions involving life and death to AI sys-
tems whose results are unpredictable? After-
ward, when these systems do make mistakes,
where do the law and society place the blame?
Ultimately, the right answer to these questions is
the one that will save the most lives.
3.3 Automobile economy
Self-driving vehicles will have a major impact on
the automobile economy and vehicle ownership.
In the future “application and content revenue
generated by mobility-as-a-service will supplant
the value of vehicle sales” [37]. This is best exem-
plified by the success of current ride-sharing com-
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panies Uber and Lyft who have currently emu-
lated the future of hailing a ride with your phone
using human drivers. It has been shown that “in
areas where Uber, Lyft, and other on-demand
ride services operate, consumers may buy fewer
cars and even take fewer trips” [39]. As services
like Uber move to self-driving vehicles, vehicle
ownership and sales will further decrease leading
to a major shift in today’s automotive economies
[8].
4 Literature Review
4.1 Tesla: An Update on Last
Week’s Accident
Tesla’s post on March 30, 2018, stated that
though Autopilot was engaged, the driver ig-
nored warnings and should have been paying at-
tention enough to avoid the accident. Since “the
driver had about five seconds and 150 meters of
unobstructed view of the concrete divider with
the crushed crash attenuator, but the vehicle
logs show that no action was taken”. Tesla be-
lieves that “no one knows about the accidents
that didn’t happen, only the ones that did. The
consequences of the public not using Autopilot,
because of an inaccurate belief that it is less safe,
would be extremely severe”. Tesla does not be-
lieve they should be at fault because the driver
was not paying attention while using Autopilot.
They further believe that it would be unethical
to not release Autopilot as they believe it saves
more lives [53].
4.2 Tab Turner: Tesla won’t be
able to put crash defense on
Autopilot
Tab Turner, a lawyer who specializes in auto-
defect cases states that “there’s a concept in the
legal profession called an attractive nuisance...
These devices are much that way right now.
They’re all trying to sell them as a wave of the
future, but putting in fine print, Don’t do any-
thing but monitor it. It’s a dangerous concept”.
Turner believes that Tesla is at fault and that
“warnings alone are never the answer to a design
problem” [38].
4.3 National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration: Auto-
mated Vehicles for Safety
The NHTSA argues that “there is no vehicle cur-
rently available for sale that is ’self-driving’. Ev-
ery vehicle currently for sale in the United States
requires the full attention of the driver at all
times for safe operation.” Thus Tesla’s market-
ing of its Autopilot system as full self-driving ca-
pability is incorrect by the NHTSA. [36].
5 How the Software Engi-
neering Code of Ethics
Applies
According to the IEEE/ACM Software Engi-
neering Code of Ethics (SECOE), software en-
gineers are individuals “who contribute by direct
participation ... to the ... development ... and
testing of software systems” [10].
5.1 Definitions
5.1.1 Direct participation
Direct participation is defined as “the process
during which individuals, groups, and organiza-
tions are consulted about or have the opportu-
nity to become actively involved in a project or
program of activity” [21]. Tesla’s software en-
gineers are consulted and have the opportunity
to actively “contribut[e] to the implementation
of the software system” and thus the term di-
rect participation holds in the domain of Tesla’s
Autopilot system [50].
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5.1.2 Testing
In the software domain, testing is “a set of pro-
cesses aimed at investigating, evaluating and as-
certaining the completeness and quality of com-
puter software.”[7] Tesla requires that software
engineers in their company have “Extensive ex-
perience creating, presenting, and refining clear,
compelling technical specifications ... and test
plans”[50]. As such, it is expected that engineers
that work in the company follow a set of pro-
cesses to evaluate the quality of their software
using these test plans. As a result, Tesla’s engi-
neers participate in testing and thus are subject
to the SECOE.
5.1.3 Development
In the field of software, development is defined
as “writing a series of interrelated programming
code...using a specific programming language..,
which provides the functionality of the devel-
oped software” [6]. Tesla’s engineers “develop
embedded firmware in C that implements the
... software architecture for Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Sensors” [50].
Thus, Tesla’s engineer’s write a series of code
that provides the functionality of the Autopilot
software. They further develop this software us-
ing a specific programming language, C. As a
result, Tesla’s engineer’s act of writing code to
build the autopilot system falls under the defini-
tion of the term development in this domain and
is subject to the SECOE.
5.1.4 Software Systems
A software system can be defined as “a system of
intercommunicating components based on soft-
ware forming part of a computer system (a com-
bination of hardware and software)” [23] Tesla’s
Autopilot system is software that fuses input
from various sensors: namely, cameras, ultra-
sonic, and radar, to provide advanced driver as-
sistance capabilities [50] As such, the Autopilot
system falls under the category of a Software sys-
tem and is subject to the SECOE.
5.2 Subject to SECOE?
As shown above, Tesla and its engineers un-
der the company’s direction, wrote, developed,
tested, and shipped the code and software for Au-
topilot. As a result, they fall under the definition
of a Software Engineer according to the SECOE
and “shall adhere to the [Software Engineering]
Code of Ethics and Professional Practice” [10].
6 Analysis of relevant
SECOE Tenets
6.1 Tenet 1.05
Cooperate in efforts to address matters of
grave public concern caused by software, its
installation, maintenance, support or docu-
mentation [10]
6.1.1 Definitions
6.1.1.1 Cooperate
Cooperate is defined as “act jointly; work to-
ward the same end” and “assist someone or com-
ply with their requests” [20]. In context, Tesla’s
cooperation would include working jointly with
the National Transportation Safety Board and
other government agencies to thoroughly investi-
gate the event. It also includes complying with
legal and other requests from these agencies and
acting as directed. Cooperation would also in-
clude working with agencies to release accurate
information to the public.
6.1.1.2 Grave public concern
A grave public concern is a public concern “giv-
ing cause for alarm” [4]. Examples of this can
include human health and wellbeing, public se-
curity, or other public matters. According to the
CDC today, “Road traffic crashes are a leading
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cause of death in the United States and the lead-
ing cause of death for healthy U.S. citizens”.[9]
In fact, each day “an estimated 3,400 people are
killed globally in road traffic”.[9] As such, “the
number of people killed in car accidents every
year is an alarming number”[11] and as a result
road traffic-related fatalities meet the definition
of a grave public concern.
6.1.1.3 Installation, maintenance
Installation is defined as “the process of mak-
ing hardware and/or software ready for use” [47].
Tesla deploys its autopilot software on vehicles
for use [48] and even installs software updates
remotely [52].
6.1.2 Domain Specific Rule (DSR)
In the domain of self-driving vehicle acci-
dents, tenet 1.05 requires that Tesla act jointly
with government investigations of road traffic
related human fatalities caused by software,
its deployment, software updates, support or
documentation.
6.1.3 Analysis
6.1.3.1 Fatalities caused by software
On March 23rd, 2018, a Tesla vehicle crashed
into a highway divider. As it was under the au-
topilot system, the fatality was caused by soft-
ware and more specifically its deployment onto
the vehicle [53]. In a report released by the
NTSB, it was confirmed that “Autopilot was en-
gaged ahead of the crash” and “that a naviga-
tion mistake by Autopilot contributed to Huang’s
death”[35]. It further gives details that the Au-
topilot software “began a left steering movement
while following a lead vehicle”, “began to acceler-
ate, reaching a speed of 70.8mph just before the
crash”, and that there was no “precrash brak-
ing or evasive steering movement detected”[35].
Thus, it is concluded by the report that the the
Autopilot software system contributed to the fa-
tality. As a result, this incident is subject to the
Domain Specific Rule.
6.1.3.2 Act jointly
Tesla released investigative information before
it was vetted and confirmed by the National
Transportation Safety Board. This is in direct
disagreement with the fact that the “National
Transportation Safety Board expects parties in-
volved in their investigations to inform them
of releases before making information public.”
Furthermore, in discussing the situation, a Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board spokesman
said that “the uncoordinated release of inves-
tigative information can affect how other parties
work with us in the future so we take each unau-
thorized release seriously” [40]. According to
National Transportation Safety Board, Tesla at-
tempted to merely speculate and make assump-
tions about the crash before evidence could be
reviewed by government agencies. By not co-
operating with the authorities, Tesla puts the
public and those involved in future accidents in
grave public danger by releasing unconfirmed in-
formation about ongoing investigations [40]. As
a result of Tesla’s mishandling of investigative in-
formation and lack of coordination with govern-
ment agencies, the company was removed from
the investigation by the National Transportation
Safety Board [43].
6.1.4 Results
The Tesla vehicle incident of March 23rd, 2018
fulfills the definition of a human fatality caused
by software and its deployment. As a result, this
therefore subjects the company to the Domain
Specific Rule. In addition, Tesla’s release of un-
coordinated and vetted information in it’s inves-
tigation with a government agency is in clear vi-
olation of the “act jointly” clause of the Domain
Specific Rule. By violating this principle and be-
ing subject to the Domain Specific Rule, we con-
clude that Tesla acted unethically in the inves-
tigation as defined by the Software Engineering
Code of Ethics.
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6.2 Tenet 3.10
Ensure adequate testing, debugging, and
review of software and related documents on
which they work [10].
6.2.1 Definitions
6.2.1.1 Adequate testing
Adequate can be defined as “equal to some re-
quirement; proportionate” [19]. Testing is de-
fined in the software industry as “the process
of validating and verifying that a software pro-
gram/application/product: meets the business
and technical requirements that guided its design
and development; works as expected; and can
be implemented with the same characteristics”
[26]. Combining these two definitions, adequate
testing can be defined in our domain as propor-
tionately verifying that software meets technical
requirements, works as expected, and can be im-
plemented.
6.2.2 Domain Specific Rule
In the domain of self driving vehicles, tenet 3.10
can be written as ensure that all software and
related documents are thoroughly verified and
validated to meet technical requirements, before
being released to vehicles.
6.2.3 Analysis
6.2.3.1 Thoroughly verified and validated
to meet technical requirements
In some software cases, it is possible to test the
full set of and types of inputs. These are de-
scribed as software that has an oracle, “the tester
or an external mechanism can accurately decide
whether or not the output produced by a pro-
gram is correct”[56]. Software programs that
deal with well formatted input and predictable
outputs are testable to a great extent. On the
other hand, when the input is varied and mis-
formed, or the “right” answer is unknown, tradi-
tional software testing practices break down [56].
The wide range of possible inputs and sce-
narios with self-driving vehicles is impossible to
cover through standard testing practices. [31].
As such, software companies in this domain must
test to the best of their ability. As a consequence,
only then can the software companies certify
and deploy their software in narrow situations in
which it is thoroughly tested, a method known as
Phased deployment [31]. Phased deployment is
a method that in which software will work only
in the specific conditions in which it was tested,
but then failover when the “operational scenario
suddenly becomes invalidated”[31].. Tesla’s mar-
keting page for Autopilot claims that “a forward-
facing radar with enhanced processing provides
additional data about the world on a redundant
wavelength that is able to see through heavy rain,
fog, dust and even the car ahead” [48]. It is im-
possible to test in all possible scenarios, in which
a car will find itself in heavy rain, fog, dust,
etc. As a result, this claim in Autopilot’s re-
lated documentation is not thoroughly verifiable
and should have been removed as it is in direct
contradiction with the Domain Specific Rule.
6.2.3.2 Verification before release
Beta products are products usually released to
customers who want to help test new features,
with the prior knowledge that not all of the
features may work correctly [25]. It is com-
mon practice for software companies who make
smartphone apps, web applications like Gmail,
and other software tools to perform this type of
release using beta products[15]. On the other
hand, it is uncommon and unusual for automo-
tive companies to release beta software as “every
other automaker from BMW to Cadillac flat-
out refuses to beta test driverless tech on the
public”[30]. It is also understood that releasing
beta automotive software “is far from satisfac-
tory, when it comes to ensuring the safety of the
Tesla driver as well as everyone else on the road”
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even if “the driver check[s] an acknowledgment
box that warns them the system is in beta”[30].
On February 23rd, 2018, Tesla began beta-
testing new software that would enhance the Au-
topilot system [34]. The new software featured a
new update where the vehicle would “center it-
self within the lane” while under the Autosteer
component of Autopilot [41]. This beta function-
ality is blamed for the crash because the vehicle
centered itself between two diverging lanes and
therefore drove straight into the center barrier
[32]. As a matter of fact, Tesla routinely releases
beta software, notably software in which not all
features may work correctly, to users and even
charges consumers to test its beta software [27].
As Tesla released[34] and continues to release
beta software[5] which is defined as software in
which “not all features may work correctly”, the
company violates the “thoroughly verified and
validated...before release” clause of the Domain
Specific Rule.
6.2.3.3 Conclusion
Tesla’s lack of adequate testing and documenta-
tion regarding the strict operational scenarios in
which autopilot functions, violates the adequate
testing clause of the Domain Specific Rule. In
addition, the release of beta software to Tesla
vehicle owners violates the Domain Specific Rule
condition that all software must be thoroughly
tested before it is released to consumers. We
can conclude that by violating these two sec-
tions of the Domain Specific Rule, Tesla did not
ensure that all software and related documents
are thoroughly verified and validated to meet
technical requirements, before being released to
vehicles and that Tesla has therefore acted in an
unethical manner.
6.3 Tenet 6.07
Be accurate in stating the characteristics
of software on which they work, avoiding not
only false claims but also claims that might
reasonably be supposed to be speculative,
vacuous, deceptive, misleading, or doubtful
[10].
6.3.1 Definitions
6.3.1.1 Software on which they work
In our domain, “software on which they work”
can be defined as the Tesla Autopilot system,
since Tesla Autopilot Engineers “contribut[e] to
the implementation of the software system” [50].
6.3.1.2 Deceptive, Misleading
Deceptive is defined as “giving an appearance
or impression different from the true one; mis-
leading” [2]. Deceptive practices in this domain
include providing misleading marketing materi-
als or not stating true limitations[3]. Of all the
“most heavily weighed factor is the advertise-
ment’s potential to injure a customer”[3].
6.3.2 Domain Specific Rule
In the domain of self-driving cars, tenet 6.07
requires that Tesla be accurate in stating the
characteristics of the Autopilot system, avoiding
not only false marketing claims but also claims
that may mislead or injure customers and not
state true limitations of software.
6.3.3 Analysis
6.3.3.1 Accurate stating of characteris-
tics of the Autopilot System
On Tesla’s main marketing site for Autopi-
lot, they provide the broad claim that “all
Tesla vehicles produced in our factory, includ-
ing Model 3, have the hardware needed for full
self-driving capability”[48]. Tesla believes they
accomplished by using forward-facing radar and
cameras “eight, enabling full self-driving in al-
most all circumstances” [48].
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On the other hand, almost every other ad-
vanced self-driving system in existence today, in-
cluding those from Google, Uber, and Cruise,
use a much different technology, LiDAR [18]. Li-
DAR is a technology that is much more expensive
than cameras but provides more refined 3D maps
of the world surrounding the self-driving vehicle.
Tesla is attempting to build self-driving vehicles
using technology that industry has set aside as
being insufficient. In fact, researchers found that
“The primary functional sensor gap between to-
days ADAS and higher level autonomous vehi-
cles will be filled with the addition of LiDAR,
which will help to provide reliable obstacle de-
tection and simultaneous location and mapping
(SLAM)”[54]. Tesla claims with their statement
“full self-driving capability”[48] that their vehicle
has higher level autonomous capability yet they
do not use LiDAR which has been shown an nec-
essary for autonomous capability by researchers.
As a result of unreliable object detection, in re-
cent months, Tesla vehicles have hit a parked
fire truck [46] and a parked police cruiser [57] all
while under Autopilot. This is a direct cause of
Tesla’s choice to forgo LiDAR as radar “systems
are designed to ignore static obstacles because
otherwise, they couldn’t work at all”[46]. Tesla’s
statement that their system has “the hardware
needed for full self-driving capability”[48], while
using technology deemed by researchers to be in-
sufficient for higher level autonomous, is a clear
violation of the Domain Specific Rule.
6.3.3.2 Misleading marketing claims,
state limitations
Tesla also makes many marketing claims on their
Autopilot website and throughout their car or-
dering process. For example, the company claims
that their “system is designed to be able to con-
duct short and long distance trips with no action
required by the person” and will “navigate ur-
ban streets (even without lane markings), man-
age complex intersections with traffic lights, stop
signs and roundabout” [48]. Nevertheless, in
between these statements, the company places
a statement that states “it is not possible to
know exactly when each element of the function-
ality described above will be available, as this is
highly dependent on local regulatory approval”
[48]. This statement seems to place the availabil-
ity of functionality on local regulators, when in
fact the technology is incapable of providing this
functionality even with regulatory approval as is
shown prior. This marketing page also does not
include literature that states drivers must keep
their hands on the wheels at all times while the
car is self-driving, despite Tesla themselves stat-
ing this in other less visible areas like blog posts
[53] and in the owners manual[13]. By placing
important safety information in less visible ar-
eas, Tesla may mislead customers. Furthermore,
engineers within the company “did not believe
the system was ready to safely control a car”[42].
However, Elon Musk, Tesla’s CEO, announced
its cars would have the capability of full self-
driving functionality [42]. The direct contradic-
tion of marketing materials to internal engineers’
beliefs shows that the company made claims that
did not state the true limitations of their soft-
ware.
6.3.4 Conclusions
Tesla claims that their vehicle has the hardware
to enable full self-driving capability even while
using insufficient technology, cameras and radar
instead of LiDAR, according to industry and re-
searchers. In addition, Tesla relegates important
safety information away from marketing materi-
als and knows that its system has safety issues
according to engineers. As a result, we can con-
clude that Tesla violated the “be accurate in stat-
ing the characteristics of the Autopilot system”
clause and “avoid false marketing claims” clause
of the Domain Specific Rule and thus acted un-
ethically according to the Software Engineering
Code of Ethics.
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6.4 Tenet 6.08
Take responsibility for detecting,
correcting, and reporting errors in soft-
ware and associated documents on which
they work.[10]
6.4.1 Definitions
6.4.1.1 Take responsibility
Responsibility is defined as “the state or fact of
being responsible, answerable, or accountable for
something within one’s power, control, or man-
agement” [22]. As such, in the domain of soft-
ware, taking responsibility can be defined as be-
ing accountable when mistakes occur in software.
6.4.1.2 Correcting
. Correct is defined as “to alter or adjust so as
to bring to some standard or required condition”
[55]. In the domain of software, corrections are
referred to as “patching” which involves “fixing
bugs that make the software run slow or not work
right”[14]. When making these corrections or
patches, there are “best practices” which include
“making sure you do it in a timely manner”[14].
6.4.2 Domain Specific Rule
In the domain of self-driving cars, Tenet 6.08
can be written as Be accountable for mistakes in
detection and correction, and take responsibility
for patching software in a timely manner for
self-driving software.
6.4.3 Analysis
6.4.4 Patching software in a timely fash-
ion
Prior to the deadly crash on March 23rd, 2018,
the driver of the vehicle took his Model X to
a Tesla dealership multiple times according to
his family. The driver complained that the ve-
hicle “kept veering towards the same barrier on
Highway 101, near Mountain View, California”
[32]. This is the same barrier into which the ve-
hicle ultimately crashed, killing the driver. Tesla
claims that they have no records indicating that
the driver complained about this or any other
Autopilot issue with his vehicle to the company
[32].
In addition, the company made no immedi-
ate move to correct the software to handle simi-
lar issues after an incident occurred in September
2017. Reporters from ABC7 news found footage
of another incident in which a Tesla vehicle also
crashed into a center divider in similar conditions
(low sun angle, clear lane markings, on Autopi-
lot) [41]. Issuing a fix at that time may have
prevented the fatality in March 2018. Further-
more, even a week after the deadly incident, an-
other Tesla owner recorded a video of his vehi-
cle also swerving towards the same center divider
and posted it online [41]. Tesla could have taken
action to disable Autopilot in that zone for the
interim, but ultimately chose not to make any
modifications or adjustments to the software.
6.4.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, Tesla did not fix the necessary fixes
with its Autopilot system in a timely manner
and thereby did not immediately acknowledge
fault. This is in violation of the Domain Spe-
cific Rule clause “take responsibility for patching
software in a timely manner for self-driving soft-
ware”. Thus, the company acted in an unethical
manner according to the Software Engineering
Code of Ethics.
6.5 Tenet 6.12
Express concerns to the people involved
when significant violations of this Code are
detected unless this is impossible, counter-
productive, or dangerous.[10]
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6.5.1 Definitions
6.5.1.1 Express concern
Concern can be defined as “a feeling of worry
about something, especially one that a lot of peo-
ple have about an important issue” [1]. In the
software domain, expressing concern can be de-
fined as showing a feeling of worry about some-
thing through the software company’s communi-
cations.
6.5.1.2 Significant Violation of this Code
. A violation can be defined as “the action of vi-
olating someone or something.”[24]. The ACM,
in their explanation of the Software Engineering
Code of Ethics states that “In all these judg-
ments concern for the health, safety and wel-
fare of the public is primary”.[10] As such, In
the domain of self-driving cars and the SECOE,
we can define a significant violation as the ac-
tion of violating the health, safety, and welfare
of self-driving car users.
6.5.2 Domain Specific Rule
In our domain of self-driving vehicles, Tenet
6.12 can be written as show a feeling of worry
through company communications to the people
involved when the health, safety, and welfare of
self-driving car customers is violated unless this
is counter-productive.
6.5.3 Analysis
6.5.3.1 Show feeling of worry through of-
ficial communication
After the March 23, 2018 incident, Tesla released
a blog post describing what they believed may
have happened. The company calls out details
such as the “cruise control follow distance set to
minimum”, “driver’s hands were not detected on
the wheel 6 second prior to the accident”, “no
action being taken by the driver”, “audible warn-
ings earlier in ride” [53]. In addition, the post-
ing makes no attempt to acknowledge that the
Autopilot mistook lane markings, departed the
lane, and accelerated into the barrier[45]. It also
does not say whether or not Autopilot alerted the
driver that it was not confident in lane markings,
which it usually performs though audio warn-
ings [45]. Tesla’s response focuses mainly on
the driver, his car configuration, and other de-
tails that take attention away from the simple
fact that Autopilot was active during the ac-
cident and did not do anything to prevent the
accident[35]. They place all blame on the driver
for not paying attention, which does not show a
feeling of worry towards the people involved. In
the past, the company has brought up statisti-
cal safety points whenever an incident occurred,
which the company even admits was seen as lack-
ing empathy for the situation [53]. An analyst
stated that Tesla explicitly uses data gathered
from its vehicles to protect itself, even if it means
going after its own customers[28]. As a result,
Tesla violated the “welfare of self-driving car cus-
tomers” clause of the DSR and is in violation of
Tenet 6.12.
6.5.3.2 Unless counter-productive
Official communication expressing deeper con-
cern was never published following the incident
[29]. In addition, it is not counter-productive
or dangerous to express sympathy for victims
of self-driving car accidents. Some may claim
that it may slow down adoption of the technol-
ogy, but expressing concern will show consumers
that companies are willing to make changes to
self-driving software that takes human lives into
its hands [17]. As a result, Tesla’s response does
not meet the “unless counter-productive” clause
of the DSR and therefore the company is still in
violation of the Domain Specific Rule.
6.5.4 Conclusion
Tesla’s immediate communication following the
incident focused primarily on reasons why the
driver was at fault and did not acknowledge or
express concern for the people involved. The
company focused more on the faults of the driver
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than the faults of their Autopilot system and
showed a lack of concern for the personal feel-
ings of those involved. As such the company
violated the “show a feeling of worry through
company communications” clause of the Do-
main Specific Rule of show a feeling of worry
through company communications to the people
involved when the health, safety, and welfare of
self-driving car customers is violated unless this
is counter-productive. Thus, the company acted
unethically according to the Software Engineer-
ing Code of Ethics.
7 Conclusion
On March 23rd, 2018, Walter Huang’s Tesla
Model X crashed head first into a highway gore
point along Highway 101 and 85 in Mountain
View, California. The car at the time was un-
der the control of Autopilot; however, it did not
attempt to slow down and the driver of the ve-
hicle died as a result of injuries sustained in the
crash [53].
Tesla acted as a Software Engineer in its de-
velopment, testing, and release of the Autopilot
system and according to the SECOE “shall ad-
here to the [Software Engineering] Code of Ethics
and Professional Practice” [10].
By our Analysis of Tenet 1.05, we found that
Tesla was unethical in its lack of cooperation with
government agencies. Analysis of 3.10 and 6.07
show that Tesla’s actions were unethical in that
the company failed to perform adequate testing
and then communicate the possible failure modes
and software limitations in deceptive marketing
materials. Analysis of Tenet 6.08 and 6.12 fi-
nally show that Tesla did not express significant
concern for the persons involved with the inci-
dent and that they shied away from taking full
responsibility for the incorrect actions of Autopi-
lot.
Ultimately, the analysis of these 5 tenets
shows that Tesla’s advertisement of the prod-
uct under the name Autopilot, its failure to ade-
quately test and correct mistakes, and its actions
during and after the death of Walter Huang was
unethical by the standards set forth by the Soft-
ware Engineering Code of Ethics.
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